Current Circuit Splits
CIVIL MATTERS
Bankruptcy .......................................................................................... 361
Claim Preclusion – Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA);
Simon v. FIA Card Services, North America, 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir.
2013) ................................................................................................. 361
Civil Procedure ................................................................................... 362
Forum Selection Clause – Interpretation and Enforceability;
Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014)................. 362
Standard of Review – Intentional Discrimination; S.H. v. Lower
Merion School District, 729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2013) ....................... 362
The Finality Requirement – Conditional Dismissal; Page Plus of
Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC, 733 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2013) .. 363
FED. R. CIV. P. 68 – Unaccepted Settlement Offers; Diaz v. First
American Home Buyers Protection Corp., 732 F.3d 948 (9th Cir.
2013) ................................................................................................. 363
Constitutional Law ............................................................................. 364
Civil Rights – Freedom of Religion; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013) ................................................................... 364
Eighth Amendment – Consent Defense; Graham v. Sheriff of Logan
County, 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013) ........................................... 364
Employment Law ................................................................................ 365
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Title II – Employment
Discrimination; Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir.
2013) ................................................................................................. 365

359

360

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 10:359

Affirmative Defenses – Concilation; EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC,
738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013) ............................................................ 366
Religious Freedom – Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) ................. 366
Family Law .......................................................................................... 367
Hague Convention – Article 12; Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2013) .......................................................................................... 367
Immigration Law ................................................................................ 368
Statutory Interpretation – Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act; Tobar-Barrera v. Holder, No. 111447, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22040 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013) .......... 368
Asylum Petition – Due Process; Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263
(9th Cir. 2013)................................................................................... 368
Labor Law ........................................................................................... 369
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) – Union Employee
Pay; Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport v. United Steel, Paper, & Forestry,
Rubber Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers
International Union, 734 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2013) ........................... 369
Securities Law .................................................................................... 370
Securities Act Section 13 – Pleading Requirements; Pension Trust
Fund for Operating Engineers v. Mortgage Asset Securities
Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2013) ............................... 370
CRIMINAL MATTERS
Constitutional Law ............................................................................. 371
Second Amendment – Domestic Violence Convictions; United
States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).............................. 371
True Threats – Intent Requirement; United States v. Martinez, 736
F.3d 981 (11th Cir. 2013) ................................................................. 371
Criminal Procedure ............................................................................ 372
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 – Playback Recordings; U.S. v. MonserrateValentin, 729 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2013) ............................................... 372

Spring 2014]

Circuit Splits

361

Judicial Procedure .............................................................................. 372
Savings Clause – Sentencing Claims; Bryant v. Coleman, 738 F.3d
1253 (11th Cir. 2013)........................................................................ 372

CIVIL MATTERS
BANKRUPTCY
Claim Preclusion – Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA);
Simon v. FIA Card Services, North America, 732 F.3d 259 (3d Cir.
2013)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether “the Bankruptcy Code precludes
FDCPA claims arising from communications to a debtor sent in the
bankruptcy context.” Id. at 271. The court noted that the 9th Circuit
took a “broad approach, holding that a debt collector’s communications
to a consumer debtor in a pending bankruptcy proceeding cannot be the
basis of a FDCPA claim,” while the 2nd Circuit reached a similar result
on the issue without taking a “broad analytical approach.” Id. at 271–73.
The court also noted that the 7th Circuit assessed whether there is an
“irreconcilable conflict between the [FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code]
or a clearly expressed legislative decision that one replace the other.” Id.
at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 3rd Circuit agreed with
the 7th Circuit in finding that the proper inquiry is “whether the FDCPA
claim raises a direct conflict between the Code or Rules and the FDCPA,
or whether both can be enforced.” Id. at 274. Thus, the 3rd Circuit held
that when “FDCPA claims arise from communications a debt collector
sends a bankruptcy debtor in a pending bankruptcy proceeding”
regardless of whether the “communications are alleged to violate the
Bankruptcy Code or Rules, there is no categorical preclusion of the
FDCPA claims.” Id.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Forum Selection Clause – Interpretation and Enforceability;
Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2014)
The 2nd Circuit addressed “whether a federal court sitting in
diversity should apply federal or state law to determine the enforceability
of a forum selection clause designating a domestic forum . . . .” Id. at
222. The 2nd Circuit noted that the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 10th Circuits have
“applied federal law . . . to decide the [forum selection] clause’s
enforceability.” Id. The 2nd Circuit, however, opined that there was not
“as clear a prevailing approach on the question of what law governs the
interpretation of forum selection clauses.” Id. The 2nd Circuit noted
that the 4th Circuit had “applied the body of law identified in a choiceof-law clause . . . to an interpretive question raised by the forum selection
clause” and thereafter assessed the clause’s enforceability under federal
law. Id. at 223. The court disagreed with the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 10th
Circuits because “[these] courts tend[ed] to blur the distinction between
enforceability and interpretation.” Id. at 222. The 2nd Circuit agreed
with the 4th Circuit in finding there was no reason “to prevent a court
from first interpreting the forum selection clause under the law selected
by the contracting parties . . . before turning to federal law to determine
whether the clause should be enforced.” Id. Thus, the 2nd Circuit
concluded that although questions of enforceability should be resolved
under federal law, interpretative questions concerning the forum
selection clause should be resolved under the law designated by that
contractual choice-of-law clause. Id. at 224.
Standard of Review – Intentional Discrimination; S.H. v. Lower
Merion School District, 729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2013)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether the court should apply the
discriminatory animus or deliberate indifference standard in cases of
claims of compensatory damages for intentional discrimination under
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and § 202 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). Id. at 262. The court noted that the 2nd, 8th,
9th, 10th and 11th Circuits have “generally applied a two-part standard
for deliberate indifference, requiring both (1) knowledge that a harm to a
federally protected right is substantially likely,’ and (2) ‘a failure to act
upon that likelihood,” while the 1st and 5th Circuits have held that
“plaintiffs seeking compensatory damages must demonstrate a higher
showing of intentional discrimination than deliberate indifference, such
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as discriminatory animus” in which a plaintiff must show “prejudice,
spite or ill will.” Id. at 263. The court agreed with the 2nd, 8th, 9th,
10th and 11th Circuits, asserting that the “standard of deliberate
indifference, rather than one that targets animus, will give meaning to the
RA’s and the ADA’s purpose to end systematic neglect.” Id. at 264.
The court agreed with the reasoning that “a lower standard would fail to
provide the notice-and-opportunity requirements to RA defendants, while
a higher standard—requiring discriminatory animus—would run counter
to congressional intent as it would inhibit §504’s ability to reach
knowing discrimination in the absence of animus.” Id. at 265 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 3rd Circuit joined the 2nd, 8th, 9th,
10th and 11th Circuits in holding that “a showing of deliberate
indifference may satisfy a claim for compensatory damages under § 504
of the RA and § 202 of the ADA.” Id. at 263.
The Finality Requirement – Conditional Dismissal; Page Plus of
Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC, 733 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2013)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “a party’s conditional dismissal
of unresolved claims, in which the party reserves the right to reinstate
those claims if the case returns to the district court after an appeal of the
resolved claims, create[s] a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Id. at
659. The court noted that the 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits determined
“that a conditional dismissal does not meet § 1291’s finality
requirement,” while the 2nd Circuit determined that the possibility of
finality was sufficient to establish finality. Id. at 662. The 6th Circuit
agreed with the 7th Circuit finding that “finality either exists at the time
an appellate court decides the appeal or it does not.” Id. Thus, the 6th
Circuit joined the 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 9th Circuits in holding that the
conditional dismissal of unresolved claims does not create a final order
under § 1291. Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 68 – Unaccepted Settlement Offers; Diaz v. First
American Home Buyers Protection Corp., 732 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2013)
The 9th Circuit addressed “whether an unaccepted Rule 68 offer
that would have fully satisfied a plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to render
the claim moot.” Id. at 952. The court noted that the 7th Circuit has held
“that an unaccepted Rule 68 offer for complete relief will moot a
plaintiff’s claim and the plaintiff outright.” Id. The court noted that the
6th Circuit has held that that an offer of judgment that satisfies a
plaintiff’s entire demand moots the case . . . [but the court] should enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in accordance with the defendants’
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Rule 68 offer of judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In
contrast, the court noted that the 2nd Circuit has held that “an unaccepted
Rule 68 offer from complete relief [does not] moot[] a plaintiff’s
claim . . . . but [the 2nd Circuit] agrees with the [6th] Circuit that when
such an offer has been made, the better resolution is to enter judgment
against the defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The 9th
Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit finding that the court was
“consistent with the language structure and purposes of Rule 68 and
with fundamental principles governing mootness. Id. at 955. Thus, the
9th Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit in holding “that an unaccepted Rule 68
offer that would fully satisfy a plaintiff’s claim is insufficient to render
the claim moot.” Id. at 950.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Civil Rights – Freedom of Religion; Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730
F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether a for-profit corporation is a
“person” capable of “religious exercise” as intended by the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Id. at 625. The court noted that the
10th Circuit determined that for-profit corporations were not excluded
from RFRA’s protection, while the 3rd Circuit found that because a forprofit corporation is incapable of exercising religion, it cannot assert a
claim under RFRA. Id. The court agreed with the 3rd Circuit in finding
that when Congress enacted RFRA, its express purpose was
fundamentally personal and did not include “corporations primarily
organized for secular, profit-seeking purposes.” Id. at 626. The court
disagreed with the 10th Circuit as reading the term “person” in such a
way that “would lead to a significant expansion of the scope of the rights
the Free Exercise Clause protected” when RFRA was passed. Id. Thus,
the 6th Circuit concluded that a for-profit corporation “is not a ‘person’
capable of ‘religious exercise’ as intended by RFRA.” Id. at 625.
Eighth Amendment – Consent Defense; Graham v. Sheriff of Logan
County, 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “consent is a defense to an
Eighth Amendment claim based on sexual acts” between a prisoner and
the prisoner’s custodians or guards. Id. at 1125. The court noted that the
6th and 8th Circuits have held that sexual intercourse between guards
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and inmates that is consensual and voluntary “does not rise to the level of
an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. at 1124. In contrast, the 9th
Circuit adopted a “middle ground” approach by creating a “rebuttable
presumption of nonconsent,” whereby “[t]he state official can rebut the
presumption by showing that the sexual interaction involved no coercive
factors.” Id. at 1125 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
“agree[d] with the 9th Circuit’s reasoning that “the power dynamics
between prisoners and guards make[s] it difficult to discern consent from
coercion” but declined to adopt the same rebuttable presumption. Id. at
1126. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that sexual abuse of prisoners
should be treated as a “species of excessive-force claim, requiring at least
some form of coercion (not necessarily physical) by the prisoner’s
custodians.” Id.

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Title II – Employment
Discrimination; Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619 (7th Cir.
2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed “whether Title II of the . . . [ADA]
cover[s] employment related disability discrimination.” Id. at 622. The
court noted that the 9th and 10th Circuits have held that Title II does not
“appl[y] to disability discrimination in public employment . . . leaving
Title I as the exclusive ADA remedy for claims of disability
discrimination in both public and private employment,” while the 11th
Circuit has “reached the opposite conclusion.” Id. The court agreed with
the 9th and 10th Circuits reasoning that “employment-discrimination
claims must proceed under Title I of the ADA, which addresses itself
specifically to employment discrimination and, among other things
requires the plaintiff to satisfy certain administrative preconditions to
filing suit.” Id. at 630. The court disagreed with the 11th Circuit’s
failure to “consider[] the specific definition of ‘qualified person with a
disability’ found in Title II. Id. at 629. Thus, the 7th Circuit “join[ed]
the [9th] and [10th] Circuits . . . in hold[ing] that Title II of the ADA
does not cover disability-based employment discrimination.” Id. at 630.
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Affirmative Defenses – Concilation; EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738
F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed whether an alleged failure to engage in
good faith conciliation creates an implied affirmative defense to the
substantive merits of an employment discrimination lawsuit and, if so,
what is the proper judicial standard of review for such a defense be. Id.
at 172. The court noted that although six other circuits agree that there is
“an implied affirmative defense of failure to conciliate,” there is a circuit
split on the level of scrutiny that should be applied in reviewing the
alleged conciliation. Id. at 182–83. The court noted that 2nd, 5th and
11th Circuits utilize a three-part test, whereas the 4th, 6th and 10th
Circuits “inquire into the good faith of the EEOC’s efforts.” Id. at 183.
The court was not persuaded to join either side of the circuit split. Id. at
182–83. The court noted that the statute itself did not contain an express
provision for an affirmative defense nor did it contain a standard of
review that could be used by courts when evaluating the defense. Id. at
174. The court reasoned that an applied affirmative defense would not
“fit well with the broader statutory scheme of Title VII” because it
encourages employers to use the conciliatory process to undermine Title
VII instead of resolving the dispute. Id. at 178–79. Thus, the 7th Circuit
held that “alleged failures by the EEOC in the conciliation process
simply did not support an affirmative defense for employers charged
with employment discrimination.” Id. at 184.
Religious Freedom – Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013)
ISSUE ONE; The 7th Circuit addressed “whether business owners
and their closely held corporations may assert a religious objection to the
[ACA] contraception mandate.” Id. at 659. The 7th Circuit noted that
the 10th Circuit determined “that two closely held, for-profit businesses
and their owners are likely to succeed on a claim for an exemption from
the mandate under” the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),
while the 3rd and 6th Circuits found that although the owners of two
closely-held, for-profit businesses are likely to succeed on a RFRA
challenge to the mandate, their corporations—which arguably do not
qualify as “persons” under the RFRA—are not. Id. at 665 (emphasis
added). The 7th Circuit agreed with the 10th Circuit finding that the
RFRA does not actually define “person,” and that under the Dictionary
Act, Congress’s use of the word “person” may generally be understood
to include corporations. Id. at 674. Further, the court reasoned that there
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was “nothing in the Supreme Court’s free-exercise jurisprudence” to
foreclose a profit-seeking entity from making a RFRA claim. Id. at 681.
Thus, the 7th Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs—both the business
owners and their companies—may challenge the mandate because
“corporate plaintiffs are ‘persons’ under the RFRA and may invoke the
statute’s protection.” Id. at 666.
TWO;
The
7th
Circuit
addressed
“whether
ISSUE
forcing . . . [business owners and their closely held corporations] to
provide . . . [contraception] coverage substantially burdens their religious
exercise rights.” Id. at 659. The court noted that the 10th Circuit held
that religious exercise rights were substantially burdened by the
contraception mandate, while the 3rd and 6th Circuits held that business
owners and their closely held corporations “do not have viable claims
against the contraception mandate because the mandate does not actually
require them to do anything.” Id. at 687. The court agreed with the 10th
Circuit’s reasoning “that the substantial-burden test under the RFRA
focuses primarily on the intensity of the coercion applied by the
government to act contrary to religious beliefs.” Id. at 683 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the 7th Circuit held that the
contraception mandate imposes a substantial burden on the . . . religious
exercise of business owners and their closely held corporations.” Id. at
683.

FAMILY LAW
Hague Convention – Article 12; Yaman v. Yaman, 730 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2013)
The 1st Circuit considered “[w]hether equitable tolling applies to
the one-year period that triggers the availability of the ‘now settled’
defense under Article 12” of the Hague Convention (Convention). Id. at
4. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit has held that “Article 12’s oneyear period does not operate as a statute of limitations,” while the 9th and
11th Circuits have “considered the one-year period to be a statue of
limitations.” Id. at 13, 15. The court agreed with the 2nd Circuits
reasoning that while “the text of Article 12 does not address equitable
tolling explicitly . . . it does however, suggest that equitable tolling does
not apply.” Id. at 12. The court reasoned that the 9th and 11th Circuits’
view that Article 12 imposes a “statute of limitations . . . because to
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[hold] otherwise would be inconsistent with the Convention’s emphasis
on prompt return . . . [contains] no textual support . . . .” Id. at 13. Thus,
the 1st Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit in “hold[ing] that the Convention
does not allow a federal district court to toll equitably the one-year
period that must elapse before a parent can assert the ‘now settled’
defense.” Id. at 4.

IMMIGRATION LAW
Statutory Interpretation – Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act; Tobar-Barrera v. Holder, No. 11-1447,
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22040 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013)
The 4th Circuit addressed whether the term “actions taken” under
§ 321(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) applied retroactively. Id. at *8. The court
noted that the 3rd and 5th Circuits determined that “Congress intended
that section 321(c) apply retroactively to all adjudications occurring on
and after the date of enactment,” while the 6th Circuit determined that
“the term ‘action taken’ . . . derives from the point at which the removal
action begins for purposes of determining whether the pre- or postIIRIRA definition of aggravated felony applies.” Id. at *8–9. The 4th
Circuit disagreed with the 3rd and 5th Circuits finding that “Congress did
not say . . . that the amended definition would apply in all proceedings.”
Id. at *10. Thus, the 4th Circuit agreed with the 6th Circuit in holding
that the amended definition was given limited retroactive application and
would apply to “actions taken” on and after the date of enactment. Id. at
*11.
Asylum Petition – Due Process; Angov v. Holder, 736 F.3d 1263 (9th
Cir. 2013)
The 9th Circuit considered whether an immigration judge violates
an asylum petitioner’s due process by relying on a State Department
letter summarizing the investigation of the asylum petitioner’s claim. Id.
at 1266. The court noted that the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th Circuits have held
it is unconstitutional for an immigration judge or the Bureau of
Immigration Appeals to rely on a consular letter. Id. at 1268. The court
noted that the 2nd Circuit has held that federal statutes prohibit reliance
on consular letters in immigration appeals. Id. The court stated that in
immigration cases “[f]raud, forgery and fabrication are so common–and
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so difficult to prove–that they are routinely tolerated.” Id. at 1269. The
court posited that the reliance on a consular letter would not violate the
asylum petitioner’s due process, because “[w]here the petitioner has the
burden of proof, there’s nothing unfair about having a U.S. government
agent check out some of his basic facts and inform the [immigration
judge] of possible discrepancies.” Id. at 1275. The court remarked that
the permissive standards of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th Circuits, rather
than “allow[ing] more of the world’s oppressed” to obtain asylum, do
more to “favor[] the canny, the dishonest, the brazen and those who have
the means and connections to purchase fraudulent documents.” Id. at
1281. Thus, the 9th Circuit rejected the reasoning of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
6th, and 8th Circuits, and held the immigration judges admission of the
State Department Letter did not violate the asylum petitioner’s due
process. Id.

LABOR LAW
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) – Union Employee Pay;
Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport v. United Steel, Paper, & Forestry, Rubber
Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers
International Union, 734 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2013)
The 7th Circuit addressed “whether a company may legally pay the
full-time salaries of the President and Benefit Representative of the union
representing the company’s employees” under LMRA § 302. Id. at 710–
11. The court noted that the 3rd Circuit determined “that paying the fulltime salaries of the union’s grievance chairmen did not violate Section
302 of the LMRA because such payments were by reason of the union
representatives’ former employment,” while the 9th Circuit held “that a
company could legally pay a union’s full-time [union worker
representative] where [such representative] was subject to the employer’s
control and thereby still an employee of the company.” Id. at 711–12
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that the 2nd
Circuit, in up-holding a no-docking provision, determined that “an
employer could not legally pay the full-time salary of a union employee.”
Id. at 712. The 7th Circuit disagreed with the 3rd Circuit finding that “an
employee must receive the compensation or other payment because of
his or her service for the employer” in order for the by reason of
“exception” of § 302(c)(1) to encompass the payments. Id. at 719–20.
Thus, the 7th Circuit held that the plain language of the § 302(c)(1)
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exception does not encompass an employer’s “[p]aying the full-time
union salaries of [the] . . . President and Benefit Representative,” since
such “payments are by reason of the union’s President’s and Benefit
Representative’s service to [its union] members.” Id. at 712.

SECURITIES LAW
Securities Act Section 13 – Pleading Requirements; Pension Trust
Fund for Operating Engineers v. Mortgage Asset Securities
Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2013)
The 3rd Circuit considered whether a plaintiff is required “to plead
with particularity compliance with the applicable statutes of limitations”
under § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 270. The court noted that
the 1st, 8th, and 10th Circuits have “held that a Securities Act plaintiff
must plead compliance with Section 13.” Id. The court stated that the
7th, 9th, and 11th Circuits “have recently held that a plaintiff need not
plead compliance with the statute of limitations in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .” Id. The court observed that the 7th Circuit
rejected the requirement to plead compliance with the statute of
limitations “because the statute of limitations isn’t even found in the
statute that creates the substantive right.” Id. at 270 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 7th Circuit and stated
“requiring a plaintiff to plead compliance with a statute of limitations
would effectively ensure that a timelines issue would always appear on
the face of the complaint, thereby shifting the burden to the plaintiff to
negate the applicability of the affirmative defense.” Id. at 271. Thus, the
3rd Circuit rejected the position adopted by the 1st, 8th, and 10th,
Circuits and held “that a Securities Act plaintiff need not plead
compliance with Section 13.” Id. at 280.
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CRIMINAL MATTERS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Second Amendment – Domestic Violence Convictions; United States
v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), was
constitutional under the Second Amendment. Id. at 1133. The court
noted that the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 7th Circuits applied intermediate scrutiny
to uphold § 922(g)(9), while the 11th Circuit upheld § 922(g)(9) as a
“presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition” without further
constitutional analysis. Id. at 1134–36. The 9th Circuit agreed with the
1st, 3rd, 4th, and 7th, in adopting a “the two-step Second Amendment
inquiry,” which considers “first, whether the challenged law imposes a
burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee,” and second, “applying an appropriate form of means-end
scrutiny” “if the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was within
the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood . . . .” Id.
at 1134, 1136–37. The court applied the intermediate scrutiny inquiry
and reasoned, that “by prohibiting domestic violence misdemeanants
from possessing firearms, § 922(g)(9) burdens rights protected by the
Second Amendment. Id. at 1137. The court reasoned further that “the
government ha[d] met its burden to show that § 922(g)(9)’s prohibition
on gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially
related to the important government interest of preventing domestic gun
violence.” Id. at 1141. Thus, the 9th Circuit joined the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and
7th Circuits in holding that § 922(g)(9) is substantially related to the
important government interest of keeping “firearms out of the hands of
people whose past violence in domestic relationships makes them
untrustworthy custodians of deadly force.” Id. at 1139–41.
True Threats – Intent Requirement; United States v. Martinez, 736
F.3d 981 (11th Cir. 2013)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343
(2003) altered the Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)
framework of true threats “thereby overruling circuit precedent “defining
true threats according to an objective standard.” Id. at 986. The court
noted that the 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th Circuits determined that Black did
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not overrule precedent by introducing a specific-intent-to-threaten
requirement into 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), while the 9th Circuit determined
that Black requires that the speaker subjectively intended the speech to
be a threat. Id. at 985–86. The 11th Circuit agreed with the 6th Circuit,
finding that Black did not import a “requirement of subjective intent into
all threat-prohibiting statutes,” but rather was more concerned with the
overbreadth of a specific statute. Id. at 986–87. Thus, the 11th Circuit
joined the 6th Circuit in holding that “Black does not require a
subjective-intent analysis for all true threats.” Id. at 988.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 – Playback Recordings; U.S. v. MonserrateValentin, 729 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2013)
The 1st Circuit considered whether it is proper for a district court to
“allow[ ] the playback of certain audio recordings to the jury outside of
[a criminal defendant’s] presence.” Id. at 36, 41. The court noted that
9th Circuit held that “a defendant has a right to be present when taperecorded conversations are replayed to the jury during its deliberations.”
Id. at 58. The court also noted that the D.C. Circuit, held that tape
replaying “was not a stage of trial implicating the confrontation clause or
Rule 43(a).” Id. Thus, the 1st Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit in
holding that a playback of an admitted recording to the jury does not
violate rule 43 or the defendant’s due process rights as a matter of law.
Id. at 59.

JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
Savings Clause – Sentencing Claims; Bryant v. Coleman, 738 F.3d
1253 (11th Cir. 2013)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the savings clause in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e) “reaches not only an actual-innocence claim, but also [a]
sentencing claim.” Id. at 1279. The court observed that the 2nd, 4th, and
5th Circuits “limit the reach of the savings clause to actual-innocence
claims,” while the 1st, 6th, and 9th Circuits “held that the savings clause
is available for actual-innocence claims,” but not available for
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“sentencing claims alleging that the district court misapplied the
guidelines provisions but imposed a sentence within the statutory
maximum penalty.” Id. at 1280. The court reasoned that the 1st, 6th,
and 9th Circuits did allow savings clause consideration if the sentence
exceeded the maximum statutory penalty. Id. The court noted that the
7th Circuit is even more expansive in allowing savings clause claims
alleging misapplication of sentencing guidelines within the maximum
statutory penalty. Id. at 1280–81. The court further found that the 10th
Circuit is the most restrictive in not allowing savings clause relief “for
both actual-innocence claims and all sentencing claims.” Id. at 1279.
The court agreed with the 1st, 6th and 9th Circuits in finding that the
“savings clause applies to sentencing claims because Congress’s use of
the term ‘detention’ is highly significant to the scope of the savings
clause.” Id. at 1281. The court also noted that “a sentence exceeding the
authorized statutory maximum . . . is more akin to an actual-innocence
claim.” Id. at 1283. Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded that the savings
clause can be applied to sentence claims alleging the sentence exceeded
the maximum statutory penalty. Id. at 1283–84.

